Even if he is a sovereignist and not far-right, I continue to cite Pierre-Yves Rougeyron mainly for two reasons: the quality of his interviews (as well as his editorial work and analysis of current events in overall), and the fact that there is still a similarity in ideas on certain points (notably the criticism of wokism, even if I go further than the sovereignists in this direction, to such an extent that I cannot say it if I want to remain within a legal framework and that is the case, which explains why I have come to legitimately and openly claim the promotion of an extreme right which, let us say it, has not of current representation among the major media figures of the national right in France, whether Marine Le Pen, Éric Zemmour or others). Hence a deep disagreement, moreover, on the question of the relationship (including from an ideological point of view) to the theme of death and its implications.
We must be careful with these points of the debate, not only for legal certainty, but also for political intelligence. I open this parenthesis because it is important to remain aware of the fact that, especially in view of current developments, claiming to be a certain extremist is a position which requires, more than elsewhere, frequent checkpoints, for reasons similar to those encountered in situations (which may be part of everyday life) where we have to handle dangerous products. Furthermore, the desire to kill political adversaries within an appropriate legal framework may help to define the extreme right, but is not of interest in itself. What is interesting is to understand that any political regime is based on civilizational choices which, even if some refuse to see it, can lead to exclusion in its radical, deadly sense, for reasons linked to the necessity of the survival of a model.
It is, in this sense, the dividing line between the right and the extreme right, which escapes commentators who define the latter according to proven historical references but who, by omission, do not sufficiently take into account the criterion of ideological strength. However, what defines ideological force, at a certain point (the point, precisely, of rupture between the right and the extreme right), is the relationship between politics and the open acceptance of death as a political lever, as capable of being the subject, as demonstrated here, of a calm and serious presentation. Does this mean that supporters of a so-called moderate political regime have never killed? No, quite the contrary, one of the main cases to be cited concerning the purge policy carried out in France against collaborators from 1944. It is, moreover, historical proof of a divide between the right and the extreme right. Rougeyron is a sovereignist, not a reactionary.
The first political subject he addresses in this interview concerns the right-wing anti-ecology seen around him. The author's position can be summarized as follows: putting aside caricatures, he invites us to consider the management of natural resources within a national framework, these natural resources constituting the wealth of our country, hence the call for an ecology measured to the data from a restricted geographical and political group (France in this case), in preference to requirements dictated by supranational administrative entities supposedly in the name of the defense of the planet as a whole (it being understood that, if each country had enough room to maneuver to estimate which environmental policies should be carried out on its scale based on what it knows, the planet as a whole would be better off). In short: France should take care of the environment on its own scale, according to the needs of its own population.
This rationality based on control of a given territory reminds us that natural ecosystems themselves behave locally, independently of human intervention, even if there are also global ecosystems on a planetary scale. Among the authors critical of the IPCC and the global environmental consensus, we can cite Bertrand Alliot, François Gervais, Christian Gérondeau, Marc Le Menn and Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie. Still, in accordance with biomimicry, the link between sustainability and sovereignty is necessary, because we can only act on a global ecosystem if our own environment remains within reach of our decisions. Rougeyron would like a contradictory debate with Serge Latouche around the question of degrowth. He is, to say the least, more skeptical towards currents, including the extreme right, claiming the influence of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and the idea of depopulation.
We are reminded that the policies carried out against the French nuclear fleet originate from the German wind and solar lobby via Brussels. In this case I agree with Rougeyron on the management, on a national scale, of natural resources and more generally. It is, among other things, through a criticism of the mafia that, in a video dated September 22, 2012 (https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtsu3c), I had come to speak out explicitly in favor of economic relocation (therefore at a broader level than just ecological questions). The text has since been the subject of several publications (as well as that of my other videos). However, the basic principle is the same: whether we take the issue from an environmental perspective or from that of the fight against organized crime, relocation is equivalent to reappropriation. The idea is always that of the right to act on one's proximity.
I also agree with Rougeyron on his analysis of Macronie and its changes, including the latest one. But who would not agree with such an analysis (faced with the observation of an entourage of obligated people, “who do not cast a shadow over the shadow of the boss”)? Opposite, we have a Marine Le Pen who is unfortunately muzzled (my diagnosis concerning her was already disillusioned before, including in 2017: https://vimeo.com/216895041). Today, faced with the hysterical surge of mores minorities and immigrationists, I am ready to support the RN at the polls to block LFI or EELV, because the state of disintegration of France has become such that the left-wing parties risk coming to power. However, my vision of the left and the extreme left was already part, previously, of a critical perspective of recasting ideas and proposals, which has nothing to do, ultimately, with the historical reality of the left and the extreme left as they have been made, if only because I have always been: anti-Masonic, anti-mores minorities, anti-immigrationist and a supporter of the death penalty.
Calling yourself "pro" or "anti" being only of interest via the arguments which, in support of a position, open up perspectives in relation to the objectives that you wish to achieve, in this case politically , I make a new parenthesis to explain, jointly, the last four points raised in the previous paragraph. What is freemasonry, if not one of the most notable manifestations, in terms of relational networks, of humanist and fraternal ideology? If we do not condemn the latter, we do not reach the source of the problem facing countries in their inability, because of supra-state censorship, to carry out the desired policy on their soil, because humanism and fraternity are the deep philosophical cause of a political vision centered not on nations, but on the human species in the name of a notion of the common good (which is inclusive, immigrationist and abolitionist).
It is in this sense that it is interesting to explain why we are anti-Masonic, anti-mores minorities, anti-immigrationist and supporters of the death penalty: by condemning humanism and fraternity in the name of a political will for local reappropriation, we necessarily condemn freemasonry, which applies humanist and fraternal ideas, as well as its increasingly virulent political consequences as the rot inherent in this same masonic approach progresses (its political consequences being illustrated by wokist demands, which are at the same time inclusive, immigrationist and abolitionist). In short, the question arises of the world in which we wish to live. If this desired world is not one of openness for the sake of openness, nor of solidarity in principle, but one where we would have the possibility of living for ourselves and for the people close to us, the appropriate political family must be the extreme right.
This is why I disagree with aspects of Rougeyron's criticism who, for his part, remains attached to the figures of the Renaissance man, the man of the Enlightenment and the French Republic in its Gaullian and unifying sense. Without being against scientific progress, for my part I do not connect it to the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. It is entirely possible to progress in our knowledge and techniques with another philosophical and political vision. As for Gaullism, its supposed consubstantial relationship with the notion of scientific progress is even less obvious than in the case of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which, even if they can be the subject of disagreements in terms of state of mind, of finality, have maintained a first-rate historical and factual link with questions of an epistemological order. Still, if we want to relocate, radicalism is necessary in the long term.
We are all at a political impasse, at least based on the current offer and the likelihood of advancing our ideas in terms of representation in the electoral framework. The difficulty is such that we come to debate the choice of the impasse in question (with, implicitly, the idea of being able to transform the impasse into a way out, however slim the chances of achieving it may be). Therefore, when choosing between two dead ends, I prefer that of the RN to that of the sovereignists, because the latter, with their Frexit project, condemn themselves to alliances (once again Gaullian alliances) with the LFI, which is an aberration. I do not idealize the RN, and my criticisms against it remain intact, but its line is still less incoherent than that of François Asselineau who, whatever one thinks, always tends to highlight the Frexit first, domestic policy issues later. The RN, at least, presents an alternative (exit or reformism).
Another point of disagreement is the fact that, unlike Rougeyron, I would no longer put ecology forward in a political speech. Via the reference to the extreme right, the objective is to promote a world where, not only individuals can live for themselves and for the people close to them (as a guarantee offered by the privileged reference to the national framework), but also where the consumerist appeal remains a major argument. This does not mean that ecology would be absent from such a world, but that the desired part of ecology would simply be enacted, without talking about it, as an indirect consequence of other political choices considered major: French companies, employment, wages. As there are several approaches to the extreme right, and mine corresponding to a hypertrophied vision of Reaganism, what I want for France is in fact to leave the republic to transform the country into a sort of nation-market, focused on its interests.
I close this parenthesis, not without observing, moreover, that humanism, fraternity as well as the masonic notion of the common good, by the constraint operated at the level of the sharing of information that they strive to promote on a global scale, and the exhibitionism that they thus bring into practices, as a phenomenon confirmed and amplified in the age of the Internet and other mass media (which, although in decline, still exist), are profoundly attacks on any form of private life, which is why the ideology of openness must be condemned, in order to allow everyone to preserve their own sphere. This aspiration demonstrates that we, heterosexuals, have a sense of modesty and reserve, unlike mores minorities who, due to their childish need for recognition linked to their lack of maturity, engage in permanent public exposure. That being said, let's get back to the interview.
Rougeyron thinks that the ban on the abaya should have been the subject of a circular and not a debate, because the latter would obscure the real problem of current schooling in France, which is that of the loss of meaning. Without contradicting his analysis, I think that the abaya is not a major problem in our country and that its ban shows, in fact, the absence of political will to stop immigration. Indeed, in a country hostile to migration policies, the presence of visible ethnic minorities (including through the abaya) would not constitute a threat to national identity, because ethnic minorities would remain in the minority due to the intransigence of the border control. In addition to the migratory floodgates, the rotting of French identity today occurs, much more than through the abaya, through the republican promotion of mores minorities. What must be banned is marriage for all, the teaching of gender theories and sex education in schools. But how would the humanist and fraternal republic prohibit its main centers of interest?
I agree with Rougeyron, on the other hand, on the way in which he presents the dissolution of Civitas, namely: a posture allowing Gérald Darmanin to flatter the leftists by showing them that he has pushed back, in France, what his target audience would consider as a resurgence of fascism. Civitas is one of the components of the French extreme right, the Catholic one in this case. It is therefore necessary, here, to consider its members as potential allies, while refusing, as Rougeyron does, the reductive position which would consist of presenting nationalism as a Judeophobic project. It is not in the name of good feelings that we should distinguish nationalism from racism but, once again, to concentrate on political divisions as such, that is to say on the actions that we want to lead. It is, in this respect, useful to remember that Civitas has never committed or even promoted violent action. This is why, moreover, I disapprove of the dichotomy between the rule of law and the legal state: we must always measure the part that goes to the presumption of innocence.
I understand, at the same time, from what angle of current affairs Rougeyron comes to such a dichotomy: the question of gangs and drug trafficking coming from Latin America, reaching Europe via Rotterdam, and therefore also bringing the dealers operating in France, from North African immigration, to become radicalized in their methods. Hence my proposal which, instead of calling into question the rule of law in the name of the legal state (since the two notions can overlap), would consist of defining different grounds, and legitimizing violent action by the police, in the form of summary executions, where it is obvious that the profiles identified flout any conception of the law. In other words, there would be a license to kill, granted to the police, which partly already exists but which would be extended to areas and situations identified as lawless. This would unbridle police action without calling into question the rule of law.
Moreover, is it not by virtue of humanist moral restraints that Rougeyron is in favor of the high security imprisonment of certain criminals who, in view of their own determination, only deserve to be broken? I mean: even if we want to break hardened drug traffickers, why not authorize the police to kill them purely and simply? Why spend money on prisons where, even if they are "gladiator schools", the criminals in question are still housed and fed? This is why, in my opinion, the most interesting part of Rougeyron's analysis which he devotes to international news is not that on drug trafficking on a global scale (because he draws reductive conclusions from it in terms of law, legal order, and, what is more, counterproductive ones with regard to its own objectives), but that on the BRICS and on dedollarization. I will devote the last paragraphs of this summary to it.
The term BRICS (initially BRIC) comes from fund management, and a report on emerging countries. It therefore names a reality pre-existing the Goldman Sachs analysis. The Brazil, Russia, India and China group has been expanded to include South Africa, however there will be no BRICS camp, even less against the West. It's just the heterogeneous diplomatic card put forward by certain countries. The question of the unit of account for internal trade within the BRICS is added to that of the possible enlargement of the group, and concerns dedollarization. The United States made the mistake of using the lever of the world currency (see, on this subject, the works of Norman Palma). Whoever holds the world currency holds global law, which has given American law extraterritoriality, but it is an economic curse, forcing a structural deficit (because everyone needs your currency, so your currency leaves your territory).
In addition, we must have a bloated defense budget to counter countries that want to challenge the world currency. In summary, if you are the United States and you keep your world currency, you are obliged to maintain an imperialism whose price is the destruction of the American domestic economy, so much so that, in the end, you no longer even have the internal wealth necessary to maintain the world currency. We have known this since the 1960s. Some Americans have always held this reasoning: the paleo-conservatives, former close friends of Richard Nixon (1913-1994) who became close to Pat Buchanan. It was not until the era of Donald Trump that American officials took up this reasoning. The Trumpists are therefore serious people. Usually, an American never talks about the dollar in a pejorative way. The problem is that dedollarization results from the withdrawal of BRICS from this market.
The reason is that the BRICS refuse American interference, or the seizure of their assets (which is the modus operandi of European countries elsewhere, thus condemning a currency which has never been a reserve, the foreign exchange reserves of the currencies having constituted the euro, once cumulative, being greater than the foreign exchange reserves of the euro as it is). We must keep in mind that the BRICS are heterogeneous, and that it is by far China that weighs the most, with a dominance within the BRICS equivalent to that of the United States in the West. In this context, either we operate the unit of account within the BRICS, or we choose the intervention of national currencies. The goal of BRICS is to increase the dollar from 70% of daily transactions to 35% but not less, otherwise China should create a clearing house for countries within BRICS that are less in demand than others, and Beijing clearly does not want to break the bank in this sense.
The BRICS, as a whole, have no interest in a sudden fall of the United States, because this would create instability that is probably unmanageable at their level. Furthermore, Russia is not the country that will liberate France by establishing a new continental order. From a realistic point of view, France could consider acquiring the status of an observer country within the BRICS, but on condition of renouncing sanctions policies (history having shown that such policies generally have the effect of encouraging sanctioned countries to strengthen themselves). It must be remembered that the BRICS open up interesting prospects, but that they are not an alliance with an offensive vocation, any more than the European countries including France. We must return to the three rules of classic diplomacy: demoralization of international life, respect for international law and respect for the right of everyone to acquire power (whatever the definition).
To return to the question of the BRICS unit of account: as there will be no clearing house, there remain on one side the supporters of the unit of account, and on the other side the India in particular which prefers national currencies. The only thing BRICS agree on is that they do not want to be governed by the West. They consider that their affairs are their own business, and that they will only speak to each other without an intermediary as long as Westerners look down on them. It is true that China, through the Russians, has succeeded in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer together, and that the BRICS will have, in 2023, 51% of world oil production. By keeping oil prices high, they are doing us a favor. Someone who threatens our supplies forces us to modernize, to do without raw materials that we do not have and therefore to motivate the genius of our engineers.
We must be careful with these points of the debate, not only for legal certainty, but also for political intelligence. I open this parenthesis because it is important to remain aware of the fact that, especially in view of current developments, claiming to be a certain extremist is a position which requires, more than elsewhere, frequent checkpoints, for reasons similar to those encountered in situations (which may be part of everyday life) where we have to handle dangerous products. Furthermore, the desire to kill political adversaries within an appropriate legal framework may help to define the extreme right, but is not of interest in itself. What is interesting is to understand that any political regime is based on civilizational choices which, even if some refuse to see it, can lead to exclusion in its radical, deadly sense, for reasons linked to the necessity of the survival of a model.
It is, in this sense, the dividing line between the right and the extreme right, which escapes commentators who define the latter according to proven historical references but who, by omission, do not sufficiently take into account the criterion of ideological strength. However, what defines ideological force, at a certain point (the point, precisely, of rupture between the right and the extreme right), is the relationship between politics and the open acceptance of death as a political lever, as capable of being the subject, as demonstrated here, of a calm and serious presentation. Does this mean that supporters of a so-called moderate political regime have never killed? No, quite the contrary, one of the main cases to be cited concerning the purge policy carried out in France against collaborators from 1944. It is, moreover, historical proof of a divide between the right and the extreme right. Rougeyron is a sovereignist, not a reactionary.
The first political subject he addresses in this interview concerns the right-wing anti-ecology seen around him. The author's position can be summarized as follows: putting aside caricatures, he invites us to consider the management of natural resources within a national framework, these natural resources constituting the wealth of our country, hence the call for an ecology measured to the data from a restricted geographical and political group (France in this case), in preference to requirements dictated by supranational administrative entities supposedly in the name of the defense of the planet as a whole (it being understood that, if each country had enough room to maneuver to estimate which environmental policies should be carried out on its scale based on what it knows, the planet as a whole would be better off). In short: France should take care of the environment on its own scale, according to the needs of its own population.
This rationality based on control of a given territory reminds us that natural ecosystems themselves behave locally, independently of human intervention, even if there are also global ecosystems on a planetary scale. Among the authors critical of the IPCC and the global environmental consensus, we can cite Bertrand Alliot, François Gervais, Christian Gérondeau, Marc Le Menn and Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie. Still, in accordance with biomimicry, the link between sustainability and sovereignty is necessary, because we can only act on a global ecosystem if our own environment remains within reach of our decisions. Rougeyron would like a contradictory debate with Serge Latouche around the question of degrowth. He is, to say the least, more skeptical towards currents, including the extreme right, claiming the influence of Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) and the idea of depopulation.
We are reminded that the policies carried out against the French nuclear fleet originate from the German wind and solar lobby via Brussels. In this case I agree with Rougeyron on the management, on a national scale, of natural resources and more generally. It is, among other things, through a criticism of the mafia that, in a video dated September 22, 2012 (https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xtsu3c), I had come to speak out explicitly in favor of economic relocation (therefore at a broader level than just ecological questions). The text has since been the subject of several publications (as well as that of my other videos). However, the basic principle is the same: whether we take the issue from an environmental perspective or from that of the fight against organized crime, relocation is equivalent to reappropriation. The idea is always that of the right to act on one's proximity.
I also agree with Rougeyron on his analysis of Macronie and its changes, including the latest one. But who would not agree with such an analysis (faced with the observation of an entourage of obligated people, “who do not cast a shadow over the shadow of the boss”)? Opposite, we have a Marine Le Pen who is unfortunately muzzled (my diagnosis concerning her was already disillusioned before, including in 2017: https://vimeo.com/216895041). Today, faced with the hysterical surge of mores minorities and immigrationists, I am ready to support the RN at the polls to block LFI or EELV, because the state of disintegration of France has become such that the left-wing parties risk coming to power. However, my vision of the left and the extreme left was already part, previously, of a critical perspective of recasting ideas and proposals, which has nothing to do, ultimately, with the historical reality of the left and the extreme left as they have been made, if only because I have always been: anti-Masonic, anti-mores minorities, anti-immigrationist and a supporter of the death penalty.
Calling yourself "pro" or "anti" being only of interest via the arguments which, in support of a position, open up perspectives in relation to the objectives that you wish to achieve, in this case politically , I make a new parenthesis to explain, jointly, the last four points raised in the previous paragraph. What is freemasonry, if not one of the most notable manifestations, in terms of relational networks, of humanist and fraternal ideology? If we do not condemn the latter, we do not reach the source of the problem facing countries in their inability, because of supra-state censorship, to carry out the desired policy on their soil, because humanism and fraternity are the deep philosophical cause of a political vision centered not on nations, but on the human species in the name of a notion of the common good (which is inclusive, immigrationist and abolitionist).
It is in this sense that it is interesting to explain why we are anti-Masonic, anti-mores minorities, anti-immigrationist and supporters of the death penalty: by condemning humanism and fraternity in the name of a political will for local reappropriation, we necessarily condemn freemasonry, which applies humanist and fraternal ideas, as well as its increasingly virulent political consequences as the rot inherent in this same masonic approach progresses (its political consequences being illustrated by wokist demands, which are at the same time inclusive, immigrationist and abolitionist). In short, the question arises of the world in which we wish to live. If this desired world is not one of openness for the sake of openness, nor of solidarity in principle, but one where we would have the possibility of living for ourselves and for the people close to us, the appropriate political family must be the extreme right.
This is why I disagree with aspects of Rougeyron's criticism who, for his part, remains attached to the figures of the Renaissance man, the man of the Enlightenment and the French Republic in its Gaullian and unifying sense. Without being against scientific progress, for my part I do not connect it to the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. It is entirely possible to progress in our knowledge and techniques with another philosophical and political vision. As for Gaullism, its supposed consubstantial relationship with the notion of scientific progress is even less obvious than in the case of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which, even if they can be the subject of disagreements in terms of state of mind, of finality, have maintained a first-rate historical and factual link with questions of an epistemological order. Still, if we want to relocate, radicalism is necessary in the long term.
We are all at a political impasse, at least based on the current offer and the likelihood of advancing our ideas in terms of representation in the electoral framework. The difficulty is such that we come to debate the choice of the impasse in question (with, implicitly, the idea of being able to transform the impasse into a way out, however slim the chances of achieving it may be). Therefore, when choosing between two dead ends, I prefer that of the RN to that of the sovereignists, because the latter, with their Frexit project, condemn themselves to alliances (once again Gaullian alliances) with the LFI, which is an aberration. I do not idealize the RN, and my criticisms against it remain intact, but its line is still less incoherent than that of François Asselineau who, whatever one thinks, always tends to highlight the Frexit first, domestic policy issues later. The RN, at least, presents an alternative (exit or reformism).
Another point of disagreement is the fact that, unlike Rougeyron, I would no longer put ecology forward in a political speech. Via the reference to the extreme right, the objective is to promote a world where, not only individuals can live for themselves and for the people close to them (as a guarantee offered by the privileged reference to the national framework), but also where the consumerist appeal remains a major argument. This does not mean that ecology would be absent from such a world, but that the desired part of ecology would simply be enacted, without talking about it, as an indirect consequence of other political choices considered major: French companies, employment, wages. As there are several approaches to the extreme right, and mine corresponding to a hypertrophied vision of Reaganism, what I want for France is in fact to leave the republic to transform the country into a sort of nation-market, focused on its interests.
I close this parenthesis, not without observing, moreover, that humanism, fraternity as well as the masonic notion of the common good, by the constraint operated at the level of the sharing of information that they strive to promote on a global scale, and the exhibitionism that they thus bring into practices, as a phenomenon confirmed and amplified in the age of the Internet and other mass media (which, although in decline, still exist), are profoundly attacks on any form of private life, which is why the ideology of openness must be condemned, in order to allow everyone to preserve their own sphere. This aspiration demonstrates that we, heterosexuals, have a sense of modesty and reserve, unlike mores minorities who, due to their childish need for recognition linked to their lack of maturity, engage in permanent public exposure. That being said, let's get back to the interview.
Rougeyron thinks that the ban on the abaya should have been the subject of a circular and not a debate, because the latter would obscure the real problem of current schooling in France, which is that of the loss of meaning. Without contradicting his analysis, I think that the abaya is not a major problem in our country and that its ban shows, in fact, the absence of political will to stop immigration. Indeed, in a country hostile to migration policies, the presence of visible ethnic minorities (including through the abaya) would not constitute a threat to national identity, because ethnic minorities would remain in the minority due to the intransigence of the border control. In addition to the migratory floodgates, the rotting of French identity today occurs, much more than through the abaya, through the republican promotion of mores minorities. What must be banned is marriage for all, the teaching of gender theories and sex education in schools. But how would the humanist and fraternal republic prohibit its main centers of interest?
I agree with Rougeyron, on the other hand, on the way in which he presents the dissolution of Civitas, namely: a posture allowing Gérald Darmanin to flatter the leftists by showing them that he has pushed back, in France, what his target audience would consider as a resurgence of fascism. Civitas is one of the components of the French extreme right, the Catholic one in this case. It is therefore necessary, here, to consider its members as potential allies, while refusing, as Rougeyron does, the reductive position which would consist of presenting nationalism as a Judeophobic project. It is not in the name of good feelings that we should distinguish nationalism from racism but, once again, to concentrate on political divisions as such, that is to say on the actions that we want to lead. It is, in this respect, useful to remember that Civitas has never committed or even promoted violent action. This is why, moreover, I disapprove of the dichotomy between the rule of law and the legal state: we must always measure the part that goes to the presumption of innocence.
I understand, at the same time, from what angle of current affairs Rougeyron comes to such a dichotomy: the question of gangs and drug trafficking coming from Latin America, reaching Europe via Rotterdam, and therefore also bringing the dealers operating in France, from North African immigration, to become radicalized in their methods. Hence my proposal which, instead of calling into question the rule of law in the name of the legal state (since the two notions can overlap), would consist of defining different grounds, and legitimizing violent action by the police, in the form of summary executions, where it is obvious that the profiles identified flout any conception of the law. In other words, there would be a license to kill, granted to the police, which partly already exists but which would be extended to areas and situations identified as lawless. This would unbridle police action without calling into question the rule of law.
Moreover, is it not by virtue of humanist moral restraints that Rougeyron is in favor of the high security imprisonment of certain criminals who, in view of their own determination, only deserve to be broken? I mean: even if we want to break hardened drug traffickers, why not authorize the police to kill them purely and simply? Why spend money on prisons where, even if they are "gladiator schools", the criminals in question are still housed and fed? This is why, in my opinion, the most interesting part of Rougeyron's analysis which he devotes to international news is not that on drug trafficking on a global scale (because he draws reductive conclusions from it in terms of law, legal order, and, what is more, counterproductive ones with regard to its own objectives), but that on the BRICS and on dedollarization. I will devote the last paragraphs of this summary to it.
The term BRICS (initially BRIC) comes from fund management, and a report on emerging countries. It therefore names a reality pre-existing the Goldman Sachs analysis. The Brazil, Russia, India and China group has been expanded to include South Africa, however there will be no BRICS camp, even less against the West. It's just the heterogeneous diplomatic card put forward by certain countries. The question of the unit of account for internal trade within the BRICS is added to that of the possible enlargement of the group, and concerns dedollarization. The United States made the mistake of using the lever of the world currency (see, on this subject, the works of Norman Palma). Whoever holds the world currency holds global law, which has given American law extraterritoriality, but it is an economic curse, forcing a structural deficit (because everyone needs your currency, so your currency leaves your territory).
In addition, we must have a bloated defense budget to counter countries that want to challenge the world currency. In summary, if you are the United States and you keep your world currency, you are obliged to maintain an imperialism whose price is the destruction of the American domestic economy, so much so that, in the end, you no longer even have the internal wealth necessary to maintain the world currency. We have known this since the 1960s. Some Americans have always held this reasoning: the paleo-conservatives, former close friends of Richard Nixon (1913-1994) who became close to Pat Buchanan. It was not until the era of Donald Trump that American officials took up this reasoning. The Trumpists are therefore serious people. Usually, an American never talks about the dollar in a pejorative way. The problem is that dedollarization results from the withdrawal of BRICS from this market.
The reason is that the BRICS refuse American interference, or the seizure of their assets (which is the modus operandi of European countries elsewhere, thus condemning a currency which has never been a reserve, the foreign exchange reserves of the currencies having constituted the euro, once cumulative, being greater than the foreign exchange reserves of the euro as it is). We must keep in mind that the BRICS are heterogeneous, and that it is by far China that weighs the most, with a dominance within the BRICS equivalent to that of the United States in the West. In this context, either we operate the unit of account within the BRICS, or we choose the intervention of national currencies. The goal of BRICS is to increase the dollar from 70% of daily transactions to 35% but not less, otherwise China should create a clearing house for countries within BRICS that are less in demand than others, and Beijing clearly does not want to break the bank in this sense.
The BRICS, as a whole, have no interest in a sudden fall of the United States, because this would create instability that is probably unmanageable at their level. Furthermore, Russia is not the country that will liberate France by establishing a new continental order. From a realistic point of view, France could consider acquiring the status of an observer country within the BRICS, but on condition of renouncing sanctions policies (history having shown that such policies generally have the effect of encouraging sanctioned countries to strengthen themselves). It must be remembered that the BRICS open up interesting prospects, but that they are not an alliance with an offensive vocation, any more than the European countries including France. We must return to the three rules of classic diplomacy: demoralization of international life, respect for international law and respect for the right of everyone to acquire power (whatever the definition).
To return to the question of the BRICS unit of account: as there will be no clearing house, there remain on one side the supporters of the unit of account, and on the other side the India in particular which prefers national currencies. The only thing BRICS agree on is that they do not want to be governed by the West. They consider that their affairs are their own business, and that they will only speak to each other without an intermediary as long as Westerners look down on them. It is true that China, through the Russians, has succeeded in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer together, and that the BRICS will have, in 2023, 51% of world oil production. By keeping oil prices high, they are doing us a favor. Someone who threatens our supplies forces us to modernize, to do without raw materials that we do not have and therefore to motivate the genius of our engineers.